How important were relations with the Soviet Union to China’s economic development by 1960?

Relations with the Soviet Union were initially very important in aiding China’s economic development following the communist victory in the civil war in 1949. However, relations deteriorated rapidly upon Stalin’s death in 1953. It could be argued that Mao’s own domestic economic policies played a more important role in China’s development by 1960.

The close relationship enjoyed by Mao and Stalin in the early 1950s was hugely beneficial to the newly formed People’s Republic of China. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, signed in 1950, cemented a military and economic alliance against the West, and the USSR granted $300 million in low-interest loans to help fund the First Five Year Plan. This led to a massive increase in industrial production and the collectivisation of agriculture. These loans helped fund new machinery for peasant cooperatives and later communes. Soviet specialists and experts were sent to help the PRC modernise and industrialise. The USSR provided technical aid for 156 industries with 520 million roubles in loans.

However, when Khrushchev replaced Stalin in 1953, he made it clear that he wanted a less close relationship with China. Loans dried up, as did technical aid. The Soviets refused to share nuclear technology, despite earlier promises, and withdrew all their experts from China in 1960. This dramatic downturn in relations suggests that they were less important to China’s economic development than initially perceived.

Indeed, it could be argued that Mao Zedong’s own domestic economic policies were far more significant. Mao's Land Reforms in 1950 saw the development of cooperatives and collective farming and an end to private ownership of land. These reforms increased agricultural production. Landlord estates were confiscated, and peasants benefited from improved farming methods and access to new machinery.

The First Five Year Plan (1953-57) focussed on the modernisation of infrastructure, such as railways, and saw an increase in the size of the urban population. Targets in heavy industries, such as oil, coal, and steel, were exceeded. This suggests that China was already moving towards significant economic progress before the relationship with the USSR soured.

Furthermore, the Great Leap Forward, launched in 1958, saw the development of communes, in which cooperatives joined together to pool peasant labour for agricultural and industrial purposes. While ultimately a failure that led to famine, the Great Leap Forward demonstrated Mao’s desire to modernise China’s economy away from Soviet influence. Backyard furnaces were set up to produce steel, and peasants, freed from agricultural labor, were employed in mining and other industries.

In conclusion, although relations with the Soviet Union initially provided a significant boost to the Chinese economy in the early 1950s, the increasingly strained relationship, coupled with the impact of Mao’s own domestic policies, suggests that they were less significant in the long run. By 1960, China was pursuing its own path towards economic development, albeit one that would prove highly problematic.

Source:

Ben Walsh, CHINA, c.1930–c.1990 (Cambridge University Press: 2019).